Contents
0. Preamble
Background
CAcert uses roots as described at Structure of Roots and many other places. Because the existing roots have been deemed to be Audit Fail here, we have to create new ones that are capable of passing a future audit. Also, this project has taken on more urgency because of the deprecation of MD5 and the general weakening of the roots over time.
0.2 Authority
The Board authorises creation of roots and subroots from time to time. The procedures are authorised under DRAFT Security Policy and are indexed into the Security Manual. Also see the wip DRAFT.
1. Documentation
Documentation is described more fully in the Roots/Library.
Discussion on the project is at cacert-root maillist. You can subscribe here and read the archives.
1.1 Procedures
Each stage should be covered by a procedure. This is your primary documentation kit:
technical organisation of roots: Roots/Structure and Roots/Contents.
ceremony for creation of root (s) and also tech stuff.
- storage securely on signing server
finally, when all is good, start the rollout procedure and Roots/TestNewRootCerts.
1.2 Policies & Decisions
Roots/Library lists the deeper references: policies and decisions:
The wip Security Manual.
As the above procedures change and evolve, keep them aligned with SM/SP.
1.1 Unresolved Issues / Documentation Task List
These need to be addressed with written procedures:
Creation of an offine root escrow method at Roots/EscrowAndRecovery
- Creation of sub-roots for different CAcert functions:
- Web of Trust (eg CAP)
- Remote Assurance (eg RAP)
- Organisation Assurance (eg OAP) (from which our organisations get their certs)
Creation of sub-roots for assured organisations (from which organisations can issue certificates from their own sub-root)
- Revocation process.
2. Planning
Currently there is no plan on the table. In order to proceed, fill in the following:
Team
take a guide from the 2008 team below.
Plan
Time-based.
Logistics
Hotels, locations, travel costs, etc.
Historical
Timeline
Most recent at top.
RESOLVED, that the existing root may not be used to sign any new sub-roots, and that the board receive reports from affected teams with a view to the issuing of a new offline root with multiple sub-roots.
An opportunity for using HAR2009 was suggested but did not work out.
Roots/20081128 resulted in the creation of Top-level root and 2 subroots (Member & Assured). However the follow-up phases did not complete.
- A meeting at or around 20081002 worked through the software and shook out bugs.
- Planning for the new roots started around mid 2008, as part of the "May Plan."
- At Top 2007, auditor announced that the old roots had to be replaced.
Teams
Team 2010
Following a long debate
building now?
Team 2008 "May Plan"
Root Key Task Force of 2008 was a CAcert Sub-Committee installed by board motion m20081008.1 see Board decision list 2008. Task Force had the following members: Guillaume Rogmany, Teus Hagen and advisor (Philipp Gühring). Audit was observer (Iang).
The following teams:
Root Key Task Force subteams |
Member |
Notes |
software configuration and scripting |
Guillaume Rogmany |
in charge |
|
Teus Hagen |
assisted |
Security Evaluation |
Philipp Gühring |
remote |
Critical Systems |
|
system admins |
|
Wytze van der Raay |
in charge |
|
Mendel Mobach |
assisted |
Oophaga |
|
servers and physical security |
|
Rudi Engelbertink |
in charge |
|
Rudi van Drunen |
|
|
Hans Verbeek |
|
observer |
||
Press & PR |
|
press contacts and news |
|
Maurice Kellenaers |
in charge |
|
Henrik Heigl |
|