## page was renamed from PolicyDrafts/IdChecking ---- [[Assurance/PracticeOnIdChecking/CZ|česky]] | '''english''' ---- /!\ '''NOTE''' ''this is not a policy track document but a guide referenced by AssuranceHandbook2. Its name should be changed to perhaps Assurance/IdCheckingPractice and it should have its status clarified in AssuranceHandbook2 as a "practice" authorised by the Handbook. or something....'' /!\ <> = Practice on ID Checking = The mimimum requirements are exactly that. They cannot be waived by the assurer. The example scenarios should give you some guidelines about the amount of points to award. Since guidelines can never cover every possible situation, the assurer may deviate from this suggestions based on her/his own judgement. == Minimum requirements == * At least one goverment issued photo ID provided * Personal meeting * CAP form filled out completely and signed by the applicant * Data in the CAP form matches the data in the ID (see also PracticeOnNames) The Assurance must not be completed if one of these is not met. == Example scenarios == The assumed standard situation is * The assurer is familliar with the presented documents * There is enough time for the assurance, noone has to hurry * The assurer has no reason to distrust the applicant For help in Assurance there is a mechanism named: Categorisation. Presented documents can be categorized into 3 groups, where the "Primary Documents" category is to select the best presented govermental photo ID. If you've presented with more then one govermental photo ID doc, you can select the ID doc with the most security features into Category "Primary documents" and the others to "Secondary Documents". If you'll presented only one govermental photo ID, thats than the "Primary Document". If you cannot categorize at least one govermental photo ID to "primary document" you cannot continue with the Assurance. So the categorisation is also a weighten on documents, a prioritization. Presented documents should be categorized into * "primary documents", goverment issued photo IDs which easily match the applicant and have a reasonable forgery proofnes * "secondary documents" would still be goverment issued photo IDs but have some flaws, like very old (>10 years), simple to forge, or there have been major changes in the appearance of the candidate compared to the photo, though still recognizable. * "supporting documents" would not be enough as a single evidence but can increase the trust into the applicants identity. This is a vast area including credit cards, expired official IDs, birth certificates, company IDs, pupil's IDs and even membership cards and things like that. Of course the assurer has to judge whether a supporting document indeed increases the trust into the ID, a hand written club card with a stamp probably would not ... This categorisation can be read as a helping mechanism. The count of variations is too high, to list them all. So the question if you were presented with only one red German drivers license as a govermental photo ID can be answered simple: * if there are no other govermental photo ID's available, the red German drivers license becomes the "primary document" * as it has some flaws, but it has security features you can check, so you can accept this document as a "primary document" and reduce assurance points. (see remark below) * with other "supporting documents" you can put this into perspective * if there are no other "supporting documents" available you can again lower the count of assurance points you'll issue * here, your tool is the count of Assurance Points you issue {{{#!wiki note Less points doesn't mean "I'm less confident". Each assurance is a Yes/No question, 'Did the filled out form and the presented documents convince me as Assurer the information is correct?" Yes or No.<
> By issueing less points you push for extra assurances, more Assurers should do a check on this Assuree (compare 10 Assurances of unexperienced Assurers vs. 3 Assurances of experienced Assurers) }}} . But also reading this ... (from [[https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.php|AP 4.3]]) {{{#!wiki note From ATE presentations [[https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Education/Material/v4-Sydney/PDF/ATE-02_Assurer_EN_Oz.pdf|ATE-02_Assurer_EN_Oz]]<
> * AP says:<
> - less points if less confidence<
> - ZERO points if ZERO confidence.<
> * If Negative Confidence<
> - carry on<
> - collect the evidence<
> - file a dispute...<
> <
> That's simple, isn't it? }}} <> {{{ Hence, the Assurance Statement goes some distance to detune or soften the need for pure identity documents ... as long as we can reliably get the guy to Arbitration, the precise Name and Documents matter less. }}} So reading this, the process of categorisation is a flaw process regarding the documents you've get presented. [[http://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.php|Assurance Policy]] and [[AssuranceHandbook2|AssuranceHandbook]] doesn't offer the categorisation into "Primary" and "Secondary documents" so this is to read as a helping mechanism for ID docs prioritization only. The definition of "Primary Documents" isn't that strictly burned as the definition of "in a government-issued photo identity document (ID)" in [[http://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.php|Assurance Policy]]. The thing is that the convention of the assurers was quite variable in the old days and there were some very dogmatic people and a lot of world travellers who could see the problems with the dogma. Another avenue in variations is the subsidiary policies under AP which could conceivably vary the practice of one govt.-issued photo Id. Hence, that old thought-experiment about the Catholic Church [[https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Assurance/papa.html|Papa]]. Hence, the Assurance Statement goes some distance to detune or soften the need for pure identity documents ... as long as we can reliably get the guy to Arbitration, the precise Name and Documents matter less. See also AcceptableDocuments ---- . CategoryAssurance . CategoryPolicy